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Abstract
Understanding cascading failures or epidemics in networks is crucial for developing effective
defensive mechanisms for many critical systems and infrastructures (e.g. biological, social and cyber
networks). Most of the existing works treat the network topology as being exogenously given and
study under what conditions an epidemic breaks out and/or extinguishes. However, if agents are able
to strategically decide their connections according to their own self-interest, the network will instead
be endogenously formed and evolving. In such systems, the epidemic, agents’ strategic decisions and
the network structure become complexly coupled and co-evolve. As a result, existing knowledge may
no longer be applicable. Built on a continuous time Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible epidemic model
with strong mixing, this paper studies stochastic epidemic networks consisting of strategic agents, who
decide the number of links to form based on a careful evaluation of its current obtainable benefit and the
potential future cost due to infection by forming links. A game theoretical framework is developed to
analyze such networks and a number of important insights are obtained. One key result is that whereas
an epidemic eventually dies out if the effective spreading rate is sufficiently low in exogenously given
networks, it never dies out when agents are strategic regardless of the effective spreading rate. This
property leads to reduced achievable system efficiency and considerably different optimal protection
mechanisms. Without understanding the strategic behavior of agents, significant security cost may incur.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Much of society is organized in networks (biological, social, economic, cyber etc.) and
networks are important because individuals gain benefits (e.g. information, resource, pleasure
etc.) through the interactions with their connected neighbors. But networks also face many
vulnerabilities which otherwise would not exist if individuals were isolated. One of the most
significant perhaps is cascading failures or epidemics — viruses (e.g. diseases in human society
and computer viruses on the Internet) may spread over the network and damage the society via
the links between connected individuals.
There has been a significant effort in the literature [1]–[5] devoted to understanding how
and under what conditions viruses become epidemic, which is crucial for designing effective
protection mechanisms to prevent damage. Most works in this literature study epidemics under
a common assumption, namely the networks are exogenously determined (according to either a
fixed topology or a fixed degree distribution). However, much less knowledge exists for networks
that are endogenously formed by strategic agents who can decide their connections according
to their own interests. In the presence of strategic agents, connection decisions and epidemics
are interdependent and hence, tremendously different results regarding, e.g. how viruses become
epidemic and how to design effective protection mechanisms, may emerge. The objective of this
paper is to advance knowledge in this regard.
This paper builds on the widely-adopted Suspectable-Infected-Suspectable (SIS) model [2]
with strong mixing in a continuous time setting. The most prominent feature of our model is
that agents participating in the network are strategically deciding how many links to form at each
time based on a careful cost-benefit evaluation, rather than simply interact with others over an
exogenously given network. Forming links have two opposite effects on the agent: on one hand,
forming more links creates more benefits to the agent (due to e.g. more information, resource and
pleasure). On the other hand, forming more links exposes the agent to a greater infection threat,
which may cause potential future costs to the agent. What makes the problem challenging is that
the level of infection threat depends not only on the agent’s own decision but also on all other
agents’ connection decisions since an epidemic is network-wide. In this paper, we develop a
game-theoretical framework to model and analyze such strategic behavior of agents in epidemic
networks and the implications on optimal network protection. In the considered scenario, agents
3are continuously interacting with each other and facing stochastic infection threats. Therefore,
agents are assumed to be foresighted rather than myopic. As a result, the conventional equilibrium
concept for one-shot games (i.e. Nash equilibrium) is no longer adequate. In this paper, we adopt
the conjectural equilibrium [6] as the solution concept. Our model does not exogenously restrict
what networks can emerge and does not pose connection constraints. However, the resulting
network will depend on specific assumptions on the connection benefit function. Although our
model is stylized, many important insights can be obtained for designing effective protection
mechanisms against epidemics:
• A fundamental result in the literature studying exogenously given epidemic networks is that
there is a critical effective spreading rate (i.e. the virus infection rate divided by the curing
rate) below which an epidemic eventually extinguishes. This result no longer holds when
networks are endogenously formed by strategic agents: for any effective spreading rate, an
epidemic never dies out.
• Suppose that the network operator can protect the network by choosing to immunize (a
fraction of) the agents (at a cost). When networks are exogenously given, immunizing all
agents is never the optimal strategy even if the immunization cost is low because it is
not necessary. However, when networks are endogenously formed, immunizing all agents
indeed will be the optimal strategy when the immunization cost is sufficiently low.
• More importantly, the optimal level of immunization protection has a much more complex
dependency on the immunization cost in the strategic case than the non-strategic case. Ignor-
ing the strategic link formation behavior of agents may result in sub-optimal immunization
deployment, thereby significantly increasing the total network cost caused by the epidemic.
• The strategic behavior of agents reduces the achievable system efficiency (defined as the
expected utility per capita) and how much the efficiency is reduced depends on the shape
of the benefit function of connections. A detailed price of anarchy analysis for the game is
provided.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss related work and
highlight the contribution of this paper. Section III develops the system model and introduces
the solution concept. In Section IV, we study epidemics in exogenously given networks for
comparison purposes. In Section V, we study epidemics in endogenously formed networks.
4Section VI extends the basic model for homogeneous agents to heterogeneous agents. Numerical
results are provided in Section VII. Section VIII concludes the paper and points out future work
directions.
II. RELATED WORK
Epidemic models can be traced back to McKendrick and Kermack [1], which studies a
Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) epidemic model. Since then various mathematical models
have been developed for studying epidemics in biological networks and computer networks.
The current paper studies the SIS epidemic model [2], [3], [7]–[10], which is another standard
stochastic model for virus infections. In SIS models, individuals are either susceptible or infected:
susceptible individuals can be infected and once they have cured/recovered, they are immediately
susceptible. Existing works in this regard can be roughly divided into two categories. The first
category [2], [7], [8] adopts a mean-field approximation to study networks consisting of a large
number of agents. Recently, the second category [3], [9], [10] tries to understand the influence of
graph characteristics on epidemic spreading rather than a simple homogeneous system. Despite
that different mathematical formalisms and tools are adopted, a common fundamental result
derived by these models is that there exists a critical effective spreading rate (i.e. the virus
infection rate divided by the curing rate) below which the epidemic dies out. For the first
category, the critical threshold depends on the degree of the network; for the second category,
the critical threshold depends on the largest eigenvalue of the adjacent matrix of the interaction
graph. All these works study networks that are exogenously given and agents cannot change
the network structure. The present paper significantly departs from this strand of literature and
studies strategic agents who form the network endogenously.
Game theoretical frameworks were developed before to study the strategic behavior of agents
in epidemic networks. However, the strategic behavior is of a different kind. In these works,
agents decide their investment in self-protection, which has an effect in either reducing their
individual infection rate [11] or improving their individual curing rate [12]. More broadly, there
is a strand of literature studying individual agent’s investment decision in network security games
[?], [13]–[15], taking into account the interdependent security risks induced by the interaction
network. However, again, the networks in this literature are assumed to be fixed.
Endogenously formed networks by strategic agents are studied under the framework of network
5formation games [?], [16], [17]. In most of these works, agents form links only because they
can gain benefits from the links (minus constant link cost). Only until recently do researchers
begin to study strategic network formation with adversarial attacks and contagious risks [18],
[19]. For instance, [19] characterizes equilibrium network topologies for games in which agents
decide their connections and whether or not to immunize themselves to protect against attack.
The current paper studies a very different problem and adopts a very different model. First,
we consider a large network and hence adopt a mean-field model. Therefore, our results are in
terms of network degrees rather than the specific graph. Second, we consider repeated interactions
and hence adopt a continuous time model whereas in [19], agents make the decision only once
before the attacker moves. Thirdly, we consider a stochastic epidemic setting in which agents are
randomly infected and randomly cured. In contrast, [19] adopts a deterministic infection model
— non-immunized agents reachable to the attacker are attacked and will not be recovered.
In the biological epidemiology research, it is increasingly recognized that a key component
of successful infection control effort is understanding the complex, two-way interaction between
disease dynamics and human behavioral and social dynamics [20]. Early works study optimal vac-
cination policies [21], [22]. Recently, economic and game theoretical models have been developed
to understand infectious disease transmission when people can engage in public avoidance/social
distancing/contact precautions. [23] studies a SIR epidemic model with strong mixing and uses
a differential game to study the potential value of social distancing as a mitigation measure.
The results are supported by numerical results but a theoretical characterization is missing. [24]
studies an SIS model in the discrete time setting with strong mixing and later [25] studies the SIR
counterpart. Different from our model, agents in these works are solving a myopic best response
in each time slot due to the introduction of an explicit infection cost function. In our paper,
infection cost is embedded in the future inability to gain benefit and thus, agents are making
foresighted decisions. Moreover, whereas [24], [25] mostly focus on equilibrium/steady state
characterization, we explicitly study the optimal protection mechanism as well as the efficiency
loss due to the strategic behavior.
6III. MODEL
A. Setting
We consider a large number of agents interacting over a continuous infinite time horizon
system. At any t, each agent is in one of the two states st ∈ S = {H, I} where “H” stands
for “Healthy” and “I” stands for “Infected”. The system state, denoted by θt, is the fraction
of infected agents at time t. We will investigate both cases that the system state θt is known
and not known to individual agents. However, we assume that the state of an agent is private
information and hence is not known to any other agent in the network at any time. For now, we
assume that agents are homogeneous. We will discuss heterogenous agents in Section VI.
Healthy agent At any time t, a healthy agent i can choose to form a directed link i→ j with
any other agent j in the network. Forming a link creates benefits to agent i that initiates the
link but not agent j. This resembles the widely adopted followers model (e.g. Twitter). Since
agents are homogeneous and agent states are private information, from agent i’s perspective,
every other agent j 6= i appears to be the same. Thus, what matters to agent i is the number of
links that it forms and the benefit that agent i can obtain only depends on the number of links
ati ∈ Z+ that it forms. To simplify our analysis, instead of assuming that the number of links
can take only integer numbers, we will allow ati to take any non-negative real value in [0,∞).
A non-integer value ati for the number of links can be interpreted as a mixed strategy between
⌊ati⌋ and ⌈ati⌉. The real-valued action ati can also be interpreted as the social activity level of
the agent.
Forming links creates benefits. Let b(x) denote the instantaneous benefit function depending
on the link formation action x. This means that the benefit created in a time interval ∆t is b(x)∆t
if x links are formed. We assume that b(x) is continuous and twice-differentiable with b(0) = 0,
b′(x) > 0, b′′(x) < 0. These are standard assumptions which state that the benefit function is
increasing with diminishing return. On the other hand, forming links also incurs direct costs. We
assume a linear cost function, namely c(x) = c0x. The instantaneous utility by taking an action
x is thus u(x) = b(x) − c0x. We assume that b′(0) > c0 since otherwise the direct cost is too
large for any link to form. With b′(0) > c0, it is easy to see that there exists an optimal action
x, denoted by W , that maximizes the utility u(x). Moreover, we have u′(x) > 0, ∀x ∈ [0,W ),
u′(W ) = 0 and u′′(x) < 0, ∀x ∈ [0,W ].
7Infected agent At any time t, an infected agent cannot take any active action (meaning that it
cannot form links with others and obtain utility). This is a natural situation when, for example,
the virus has taken over control of this agent or the agent has broken down. The infected agent
will instead go through a curing process. Once the infected agent is cured and become healthy
again, it can form links with others. The curing period follows a negative exponential distribution
with parameter δ > 0 and the agent losses any utility it can potentially obtain during this period.
Note that in the considered model, the cost due to infection is not explicit; rather, it is implicit
as a result of the inability to receive utility. This differs from previous works which assume
explicit infection costs. We believe that this is a valid and more natural formulation especially
when the direct curing cost is much less than the utility that the agent would have obtained if
it were healthy.
Infection Since a healthy agent may initiate to form a link with an infected agent (because
the healthy agent does not know the state of any other node), it may get infected via the link
that it forms. We model the infection on each link (with an infected node) as a Poison process
with arrival rate β. At the first arrival instance, the healthy agent gets infected. The infection
may be sooner (or the infection probability is higher) if the healthy agent forms more links to
infected agents. In particular, if a healthy agent forms links with y infected agent, the infection
arrival rate is yβ.
B. Strategy and long-term utility
The strategy of an agent i is the number of links ati to form at any time t when it is in the
healthy state. We start with the case that agents do not know the system state θt. In this case,
each agent i has the same information set at any time and hence, it adopts a constant strategy
ati = ai, ∀t : sti = H . We will study the case that agents observe the system state θt in Section
V.B.
If agents are myopic and care about only the instantaneous utility, then it is obvious that the
optimal strategy of any healthy agent is ai = W at any time since doing so maximizes the
current time (myopic) utility. However, since agents are interacting with each other for a long
time period, they will instead be foresighted and care about the expected long-term utility. It is
noteworthy that the expected long-term utility may be different from the realized utility but it
is the expected long-term utility that is important for decision making.
8Next, we define and compute the expected long-term utility if an agent takes a constant strategy
ai. The long-term utility of an agent depends on the state that it is in as well as the strategies
taken by other agents. Let UH(ai,a−i) and UI(ai,a−i) denote the long-term utilities when the
agent is in the healthy state and infected state, respectively, by taking strategy ai while the other
agents take the strategies a−i. They are defined recursively as follows:
UH(ai,a−i) =
∫ ∞
t=0
(
∫ t
τ=0
e−ρτu(ai)dτ + e
−ρtUI)βi(a)e
−βi(a)tdt (1)
UI(ai,a−i) =
∫ ∞
t=0
e−ρtUHδe
−δtdt (2)
where ρ > 0 is the discount rate, βi(a) is the infection rate of agent i if the strategy profile
a = {aj , ∀j} of all agents is adopted. By convention, we use a−i to denote the strategies of all
agents other than i. We elaborate this definition below:
• Suppose the agent is infected at time t0 + t where t0 is the time of the decision making,
then
∫ t
τ=0
e−ρτu(ai)dτ is the discounted long-term utility that the agent can receive during
the period [t0, t0 + t]. Notice that e−ρτ ≤ 1 and decreases with τ , which means that the
present value of utility is smaller if the same utility is realized at a later time, thereby
discounting. Moreover, a larger ρ means that the discounting effect is greater. Using e−ρτ
to model discounting is the standard way for continuous time systems.
• e−ρtUI(ai) is the continuation utility that the agent receives once it gets infected. Since the
agent is infected at a later time t0 + t, the utility is discounted by e−ρt. The value of this
utility is UI as the agent enters the infection state at this time point.
• βi(a)e
−βi(a)t is the probability distribution function of the infection time t, which follows
a negative exponential distribution of parameter βi(a) due to our model. In particular,
βi(a) = θi(a)aiβ where β is the per-link infection rate and θi(a) is the probability that
agent i connects to an infected node on each link. Notice that this probability is a result
of all agents’ strategies and hence, agent i’s long-term utility depends on not only its own
strategy but also others’.
• When an agent enters the infection state, it receives 0 instantaneous utility. At a later time
t, which follows the distribution δe−δtdt, it is cured and returns to the healthy state and the
continuation utility is UH discounted by e−ρt.
Since we consider a sufficiently large population of agents, we adopt the mean-field approxi-
9mation that θi(a) = θj(a), ∀i, j. This approximation can be well justified: θi(a) and θj(a) differs
only in situations where agent i connects to agent j and/or agent j connects to agent i, which
happens with a very small probability when there is a large population and agents randomly form
links with others. In fact, the approximation is exact if we consider a continuum population of
agents because each individual agent becomes infinitesimal. In what follows, we drop the agent
index and simply write θ(a) for all i. Note that we intentionally use the same symbol θ for the
system state, namely the fraction of infected agents, to denote the probability that the formed
link connects to an infected agent. This is because, again, these two quantities are equal due to
the law of large numbers in the random matching setting.
C. Solution concept
The long-term utilities having been defined, the link formation game with infections is clear:
each agent is a player in the game, which chooses a link formation strategy to maximize its
own long-term utility. Nash equilibrium (NE) is the most commonly used solution concept in
game theory. However, NE is inadequate in the considered game since the game is not static
and the system state evolves over time depending on the strategies chosen by the players. In
this paper, we adopt conjectural (Nash) equilibrium (CE), which is a refinement of NE, as the
solution concept. CE is defined as follows:
Definition 1. A tuple 〈a∗, θ∗〉, where a∗ is a link formation strategy profile and θ∗ is the
conjectured system state, is a CE if starting with any θ0 > 0, the following two conditions
are satisfied:
1) a∗ is a Nash equilibrium under the conjectured system state, i.e. a∗i = argmaxai UH(ai,a∗−i|θ∗)
2) The conjecture is asymptotically correct, i.e. limt→∞ θt = θ∗ when the nodes adopt a∗.
Condition 1 states that the agents are playing the game as if the system had converged to
the conjectured state even though the actual real-time system state may be different from the
conjectured state. Condition 2 states that when the agents adopt the strategies derived based
on Condition 1, the system indeed will eventually converge to the conjectured state. Therefore,
the conjecture is realized. Conditions 1 and 2 together ensure the consistency of the system
dynamics and the solution concept.
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IV. EPIDEMICS UNDER A FIXED STRATEGY
Before we study the stochastic epidemic network formed by strategic agents, we first analyze
the epidemic propagation if the agents are non-strategic and following a fixed strategy. This
analysis will be used for the comparison with the strategic case. In particular, we will focus on
a symmetric action profile in which agents adopt the same action, i.e. ai = a, ∀i.
A. Stationary distribution
The state of the system at any time is characterized by the fraction θt of infected agents among
all agents. The evolution of θt depends on the strategy adopted by the agents, the infection rate β,
the curing rate δ as well as the initial state of the system θ0. It is obvious that if the system starts
with an initial state θ0 = 0, namely there are zero infected agents, then no matter what strategies
are adopted by the agents, the system will remain in the state of zero infection. Therefore, it is
more interesting to study the non-trivial case where θ0 > 0. We focus on the impact of agent
strategy on the system state in this subsection and henceforth write θt(a) as a function of the
symmetric strategy a.
The system is said to be stationary if θt(a) becomes time-invariant. The stationary infection
distribution reflects how the epidemic evolves in the long run. We simply drop the time superscript
in the stationary distribution notation θ(a). It turns out that in the considered stochastic link
formation setting, there exists a critical number of links such that if agents form fewer than
the critical number of links, the epidemic eventually extinguishes, i.e. the stationary distribution
θ(a) = 0; otherwise, there is a positive infection probability.
Proposition 1. For given β and δ, there exists ac = δβ , such that for all a ≤ ac, θ(a) = 0, and
for all a > ac, θ(a) = 1− δβa .
Proof. To study the stationary distribution of the system, we consider a single agent and compute
the probability it is in the infected state at any time, which is
θ(a) =
δ−1
δ−1 + (θ(a)aβ)−1
(3)
There are two solutions of the above equation given any finite a. One is θ(a) = 0 and the other
is θ(a) = 1− δ
βa
. Notice that only when a > δ
β
= ac, the second solution is positive. The positive
solution gives the probability of nodes being in the infected state and it is differentiable to a
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threshold ac, where two solutions meet. At the threshold, the solution is not differentiable. For
a < ac, the only meaningful solution is θ(a) = 0, which means that all nodes are uninfected in
the long-run. To see that the system indeed converges, consider the system dynamics given the
symmetric strategy a. For any θ > 0, the change in θ in a small time interval dt is
dθ = −θδdt + (1− θ)θaβdt = θ((1− θ)aβ − δ)dt (4)
Clearly, if a > ac, then there is a solution θ∗ = 1 − 1βa . For θ > θ∗, dθ < 0 and for θ < θ∗,
dθ > 0. Thus, the system must converge to θ∗. If a < ac, then for any θ > 0, dθ < 0, which
means that the system converges to θ∗ = 0.
Proposition 1 states that forming more links with other agents increases the infection prob-
ability of the system as a whole. Moreover, there is a critical value of the number of links,
which is important for preventing infection in the long-run. The result of Proposition 1 indeed is
equivalent to the classic result in the SIS literature, which establishes the existence of a critical
effective infection rate (i.e. β/δ). This is stated in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. For a given network degree a, there exists a critical effective infection rate υc = 1/a
such that for all υ ≤ υc, θ(υ) = 0, and for all υ > υc, θ(υ) = 1− 1υca .
Remark: If W ≤ ac, then the epidemic will always die out even if agents are strategically
deciding their link formation actions since agents will form no more than W links. This is the
trivial case which we will not study. In the remainder of this paper, we assume that W > ac.
B. Optimal protection
To reduce the infection probability, the network operator may choose to immunize a fraction
of agents at an immunization cost. We assume that immunization is perfect, namely immunized
agents do not get infected and hence will not infect other agents in the network. Suppose the
network operator can choose to immunize a fraction (1− η) ∈ [0, 1] of all agents in the network
at the cost of γ · (1− η) where γ is the unit time immunization cost. Without loss of generality,
the unit cost to the network operator due to infection is assumed to be 1. Hence, if the infection
level is θ, then the infection cost is θ. The total cost (in the stationary state) of the network
operator is thus D(a, η) = θ(a, η) + γ(1 − η) where θ depends on the fixed strategy a and the
immunization strategy η. Clearly θ < η since at most η fraction of agents can be infected. The
12
following proposition characterizes the optimal immunization strategy η∗ given agents’ fixed
strategy a. We focus on the non-trivial case where a > ac.
Proposition 2. If γ ≤ 1, then η∗ = δ
βa
. If γ > 1, then η∗ = 1.
Proof. The stationary infection level θ(a, η) satisfies,
θ(a, η) =
ηδ−1
δ−1 + (θ(a, η)aβ)−1
(5)
If η ≤ δ
βa
, then θ(a, η) = 0. If η > δ
βa
, then θ(a, η) = η − δ
βa
. We analyze these two cases
separately.
Case 1: if η ≤ δ
βa
, then D = γ(1 − η). Therefore, the optimal η is η∗ = δ
βa
in order to
minimize D. The minimum total cost is D = γ(1− δ
βa
).
Case 2: if η > δ
βa
, then D = η − δ
βa
+ γ(1 − η) = γ − δ
βa
+ (1 − c)η. If γ > 1, then D is
decreasing in η and hence the minimum D is achieved at η = 1. If γ ≤ 1, then D is increasing
in η and hence the minimum D is achieved at η = δ
βa
.
In sum, if γ > 1, then η∗ = 1; if γ ≤ 1, then η∗ = δ
βa
.
Proposition 2 states that if the immunization is too costly (i.e. γ > 1), then the optimal strategy
is to immunize no agents (i.e. 1− η = 0). If immunization is not too costly, the optimal strategy
is to immunize a fraction (1 − δ
βa
) of agents depending on the fixed strategy a. Moreover, as
long as η < 1, the optimal strategy does not depend on the immunization cost so even if η is
small, it is not optimal to immunize all agents. This is because by immunizing a sufficiently
large fraction of the agents, the epidemic can already die out. Therefore, it is not necessary to
immunize all agents at additional costs.
C. System efficiency and social optimum
Suppose that instead of deploying an immunization strategy, the network operator can control
the link formation strategy of the agents. Obviously, there is a tradeoff when the utility of link
formation is involved: forming fewer links reduces the infection level of the system but also
decreases the utility that agents can obtain. The objective of the network operator is thus to
determine the optimal strategy that maximizes the system efficiency, which is defined as the
average utility per capita in the stationary distribution, denoted by E(a). Specifically, E(a) can
be computed as E(a) = (1 − θ(a))u(a). The network operator’s problem is to solve aOPT =
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argmaxaE(a). Denote the social optimum by EOPT . The proposition below characterizes the
optimal solution.
Proposition 3. aOPT = ac and EOPT = u(ac).
Proof. For any a ≤ ac, θ(a) = 0. Therefore E(a) = u(a), ∀a ≤ ac. Clearly E(a) is maximized
at a = ac. For any a ≥ ac, θ(a) = 1− δβa . Therefore E(a) = δu(a)βa . Take the first-order derivative,
E ′(a) =
δ
β
u′(a)a− u(a)
a2
(6)
Let f(a) = u′(a)a − u(a). It is easy to check that f(0) = 0, f(∞) < 0 and f(a) is always
decreasing (because f ′(a) = u′′(a) < 0) and hence, f(a) < 0, ∀a > 0. Thus E ′(a) < 0, ∀a > 0
and hence E(a) is decreasing in [ac,∞). Therefore, E(a) is maximized at a = ac. In sum, E(a)
is maximized at a = ac and E(ac) = u(ac).
Proposition 3 states that the threshold number of links eliminates infection in the long run
and at the same time also maximizes the system efficiency.
V. EPIDEMICS WITH STRATEGIC AGENTS
In the previous section, we studied the epidemic propagation, the immunization mechanism
and the system efficiency when agents are non-strategic and following a fixed strategy. In this
section, we will show that tremendously different results emerge when agents are strategic who
try to maximize their own expected long-term utility by deciding the number of links to form.
A. Conjectural equilibrium (no observation of state state)
In this subsection, we study the case that agents do not observe the system state at any moment
in time. Since the information set of agents is the same across time, we use the conjectural
equilibrium (CE), defined in Section III.C, as the solution concept. We start with a more explicit
expression of the agent’s long-term utility. By performing the integral operation on (1), the
long-term utilities are simplified to
UH(ai,a−i) =
1
ρ+ βi(a)
(u(a) + βi(a)Ui(ai,a−i)) (7)
UL(ai,a−i) =
δ
ρ+ δ
UL(ai,a−i) (8)
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Substituting UL(ai,a−i) into the first equation, we obtain
UH(ai,a−i) =
ρ+ δ
ρ
u(ai)
ρ+ δ + βθ(a)ai
(9)
In CE, a∗i is the best response to other agents’ equilibrium strategies, i.e. a∗i = argmaxai UH(ai,a∗i ).
Moreover, the conjecture has to be consistent with the reality. Theorem 1 establishes the existence
and uniqueness of the CE.
Theorem 1. The link formation game admits a unique CE. Moreover, the CE is symmetric,
namely aCEi = aCE, ∀i where aCE > ac is the unique solution of
u(a)
u′(a)
− a = ρ+ δ
β − δ
a
(10)
Proof. We consider two cases depending on the value of θ below.
(1) Suppose in the equilibrium, we have θ > 0. Then, for any θ > 0, we prove that there is a
unique maximizer a∗i (θ). To prove this, take the first-order derivative on the objective function,
which is
U ′H(ai) =
ρ+ δ
ρ
· u
′(ai)(ρ+ δ + βθai)− u(ai)βθ
(ρ+ δ + βθai)2
(11)
Let the numerator function be f(ai) = u′(ai)(ρ+ δ+βθai)−u(ai)βθ for the ease of exposition.
Clearly f(0) > 0 and f(M) < 0. Moreover, f ′(ai) = u′′(ai)(ρ+ δ+βθai) < 0. Therefore, there
exists a unique a∗i ∈ (0,M) such that f ′(ai) > 0, ∀a < a∗i , f ′(a∗i ) = 0 and f ′(ai) < 0, ∀a > a∗i .
As a result, there is a unique maximizer a∗i ∈ (0,M) of UH(ai) for θ ∈ (0, 1), which is the
solution of
u(a)
u′(a)
− a = ρ+ δ
βθ
(12)
Because every agent faces the same system state θ, this proves that, if an equilibrium exists,
agents’ strategies must be symmetric. We henceforth drop the agent index and write the sym-
metric strategy as a∗(θ).
Because strategies are symmetric in equilibrium, we can then apply the result of Proposition
1 to compute the stationary distribution. Since we have assumed that θ > 0, equilibrium must
satisfy two conditions
θ = 1− δ
βa∗(θ)
and a∗(θ) > ac (13)
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Substituting θ into the first-order condition, we have
u(a)
u′(a)
− a = ρ+ δ
β − δ
a
(14)
To prove that there is a unique solution to the above equation, consider the monotonicity of
both sides of the equation with respect to a. Clearly, the right-hand side (LHS) is a decreasing
function in a for a > ac = δβ . The first-order derivative of the left-hand side function is
u′(a)u′(a)− u(a)u′′(a)
(u′(a))2
− 1 = −u(a)u
′′(a)
(u′(a))2
> 0 (15)
Therefore, the right-hand side (RHS) is increasing in a. Moreover, notice that as a → ac, LHS
must be smaller than RHS while as a → M , LHS must be greater than RHS. Therefore, there
must exist a unique solution a∗ ∈ (ac,M). This solution satisfies the two conditions of CE.
(2) Suppose in the equilibrium, we have θ = 0. In this case, the utility becomes
UH(ai,a−i) =
u(ai)
ρ
(16)
which monotonically increases with ai. Hence, each agent chooses ai as large as possible.
However, if ai goes over ac, infection does not extinguish, thereby contradicting the assumption
that θ = 0. Therefore, θ = 0 cannot be a CE.
Theorem 1 states a result that is in stark contrast with existing works on epidemic networks
with fixed degrees: when agents are strategic in forming links, infection never extinguishes in
equilibrium for any value of β and δ (hence any value of the effective spreading rate) because
the number of links that the agents are willing to form is always larger than the corresponding
critical value ac(β, δ). Proposition 4 further reveals the dependency of the CE on the system
parameters.
Proposition 4. aCE increases with ρ, δ and decreases with β.
Proof. Let aCE1 be the corresponding CE for ρ1 and aCE2 for ρ2 for fixed δ and β. Assume ρ1 < ρ2.
Observe (10), we must have LHS(aCEk ) = RHS(aCEk , ρk), ∀k = 1, 2. Suppose aCE1 ≥ aCE2 .
Since LHS is increasing in a, we have LHS(aCE1 ) ≥ LHS(aCE2 ). Since RHS is decreasing
in a and increasing in ρ, we have RHS(aCE1 , ρ1) < RHS(aCE2 , ρ2). Therefore, LHS(aCE2 ) <
RHS(aCE2 , ρ2), which is a contradiction. Therefore, aCE1 < aCE2 . This proves that aCE increases
with ρ. The other two claims can be similarly proved.
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Proposition 4 can be intuitively understood. (1) A larger ρ means greater discounting of future
utilities. Therefore, agents have incentives to form more links to reap more instantaneous utilities
since future utilities are less valued. (2) A larger β means faster infection. Since forming more
links exposes the agent to more infection threats when β is larger, agents have incentives to
reduce the number of links formed. (3) A larger δ means faster curing. Thus the infection
threats become smaller when δ is larger because the agents can recover more quickly.
B. System dynamics and convergence (observation of the system state)
In the previous subsection, we studied the case that agents do not observe the actual system
state θt at any time t. In such situations, conjectural equilibrium is a reasonable solution concept
in which agents form conjecture about the converged system state. In this subsection, we study
the case that agents observe the system state θt and act upon this observation to maximize their
long-term utilities. We are interested in the convergence of the system: whether it converges and,
if yes, where it converges to, and how fast it converges.
At any time t, each agent observes the current state θt and determines the link formation
action at based on this information. Due to the assumption of bounded rationality, at is the best
response to θt, i.e. a∗(θt) = argmaxa UH(a|θt), where UH(a|θt) is
UH(a|θt) = ρ+ δ
ρ
µ(a)
ρ+ δ + βθta
(17)
which can be derived based on our previous analysis. Note that all healthy agents take the same
action a∗(θt) since agents are homogenous and face the same system state. Moreover, a∗(θt) is
the solution of
u(at)
u′(at)
− at = ρ+ δ
βθt
(18)
The system evolution therefore can be characterized by the following differential equation
dθt = −θtδdt+ (1− θt)βθta∗(θt)dt (19)
In the above system dynamics equation, the first term θtδdt is the population mass of infected
agents that are cured in a small time interval dt. The second term (1 − θt)βθta∗(θt)dt is the
population mass of healthy agents that are infected in a small interval dt. Notice the difference
between (4) and (19): in (4), the link formation strategy is fixed over time whereas in (19), the
link formation strategy is the best response to the current system state.
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Theorem 2. The system dynamics defined by (19) converges to θCE starting from any θ0 > 0.
Proof. The best response a∗(θt) is determined by equation (18). Because LHS of (18) is mono-
tonically increasing with a, a∗(θt) is decreasing with θt. Now consider the system dynamics.
Equation (19) can be rewritten as
dθt = θt[(1− θt)βa∗(θt)− δ]dt (20)
We are interested in the sign of dθt for different values of θt. Since θt ≥ 0, what matters is
f(θt) , (1 − θt)βa∗(θt) − δ. Since a∗(θt) is decreasing in θt, f(θt) is decreasing in θt. Next,
we show that there exists θ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that f(θ∗) = 0.
θ∗ must satisfy the following set of equations
(1− θ∗)βa∗ − δ = 0, and u(a
∗)
u′(a∗)
− a∗ = ρ+ δ
βθ∗
(21)
Rearranging the first equation to get θ∗ in terms of a∗ and substituting θ∗ in the second equation
gives
u(a∗)
u′(a∗)
− a∗ = ρ+ δ
β − δ
a∗
(22)
Notice that the above is the same equation of determining the CE aCE . Therefore a∗ > ac
and hence θ∗ ∈ (0, 1). Since f(θ∗) = 0 and f(θt) is decreasing, we know that f(θt) < 0 for
θt ∈ (θ∗, 1) and f(θt) > 0 for θt ∈ (0, θ∗). This means that θt decreases when θt ∈ (θ∗, 1)
and increases when θt ∈ (0, θ∗). Therefore, the system converges to the unique steady state
θ∗ = θCE .
Theorem 2 states that the best response dynamics leads the system to a converged state which
corresponds to the conjectural equilibrium. It is worth highlighting the differences between CE
and best response again: in CE, every agent does not observe the system state at any time and
acts based on the conjectured system state. As a result, the link formation strategy does not
change over time. In teh best response dynamics, every agent observes the (same) system state
and optimizes its strategy against the current system state. Therefore, the link formation strategy
evolves over time. Nevertheless, Theorem 2 proves that, with or without the knowledge of the
system state, the system converges to the same state in which infection never extinguishes, which
is significantly different from a system where agents are obedient and interact on fixed network
topologies.
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The proposition below provides bounds on the rate of convergence.
Proposition 5. For any initial system state θ0 > θCE (or θ0 < θCE), ∀ǫ > 0, let T (θ0, ǫ) be the
time at which θT decreases to θCE + ǫ , θǫ (or increases to θCE − ǫ , θǫ), we have
ln θ0 − ln θǫ
(1− θ0)βa∗(θ0)− δ < T (θ
0, ǫ) <
ln θ0 − ln θǫ
(1− θǫ)βa∗(θǫ)− δ (23)
Proof. The system dynamics can be written as
d ln θt =
dθt
θt
= [(1− θt)βa∗(θt)− δ]dt (24)
Since ln θt is monotonically increasing in (0, 1), θ0 evolving to θǫ is equivalent to ln θ0 evolving to
ln θǫ. Because we have shown that (1−θt)βa∗(θt)−δ is decreasing in θt and (1−θCE)βa∗(θCE)−
δ = 0, the absolute rate of change |(1 − θt)βa∗(θt) − δ| is larger if θt is further away from
θCE . Therefore, before ln θt decreases (or increases) to ln θǫ, the rate of change is at least
(1− θǫ)βa∗(θǫ)− δ and at most (1− θ0)βa∗(θ0)− δ. This proves the proposition.
C. Optimal protection
Now, we study the optimal immunization strategy for epidemic networks with strategic agents.
Again, the network operator chooses to immunize a fraction (1−η) ∈ [0, 1] of the agents at a cost
of γ·(1−η). Different from the case where agents adopt a fixed strategy, the immunization strategy
of the network operator now influences how the strategic agents choose their link formation action
and hence the total cost. The total cost is therefore D(η) = θ(a(η), η) + γ(1 − η). The next
proposition characterizes the impact of the immunization strategy on the total cost.
Proposition 6. Assume u′′′(a) < 0 and W →∞. There exist γ1, γ2 (γ1 < γ2) such that
• If γ ≤ γ1, then D(η) is increasing in η.
• If γ ≥ γ2, then D(η) is decreasing in η.
• If γ ∈ (γ1, γ2), then there exists η∗(γ) such that D(η) is decreasing in [0, η∗(γ)] and then
increasing in [η∗(γ), 1]. Moreover, η∗(γ) is increasing in c.
Proof. The infection level θ depends on η as follows: θ = η − δ
βa∗(θ)
where a∗(θ) satisfies
f(a) ,
u(a)
u′(a)
− a = ρ+ δ
βθ
=
ρ+ δ
ηβ − δ
a
(25)
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Using similar arguments as in Proposition 4, we can show that a∗ is decreasing in η. Because
a∗ is decreasing in θ, we have that θ is monotonically increasing in η, i.e. θ′(η) > 0, ∀η. Next,
we prove that θ′′(η) > 0. Because (1) θ(0) = 0 and (2) θ and η is one-to-one mapping, it is
equivalent to prove that η′′(θ) < 0 where η = θ + δ
βa∗(θ)
. Thus, it further is equivalent to prove
that ∀θ2 > θ1, the following is true
θ2
θ1
>
1
a∗(θ2)
1
a∗(θ1)
=
a∗1
a∗2
(26)
where a∗1 > a∗2. Since f(a) = ρ+δβθ , we can instead prove
a∗1
a∗2
<
f(a∗1)
f(a∗2)
(27)
Because f(0) = 0 and f ′(a) > 0, it is equivalent to prove that f ′′(a) > 0. To see this is true,
f ′(a) =
u′(a)u′(a)− u(a)u′′(a)
(u′(a))2
− 1 = −u(a)u
′′(a)
(u′(a))2
> 0 (28)
and
f ′′(a) = −(u
′(a)u′′(a) + u(a)u′′′(a))u′(a)− 2u(a)(u′′(a))2
(u′(a))3
(29)
Therefore, if u′′′(a) < 0, then f ′′(a) > 0. This proves that θ′′(η) > 0. Hence, θ′(η) > 0 is an
increasing function of η. Let limη→0 θ′(η) = γ1 and limη→1 θ′(η) = γ2. Clearly γ1 < γ2.
Notice D′(η) = θ′(η)− γ. If γ < γ1, then D′(η) > 0, ∀η. This means that D(η) is increasing
in η. If γ > γ2, then D′(η) < 0, ∀η. This means that D(η) is decreasing in η. If γ ∈ (γ1, γ2),
then there must exist η∗ such that θ′(η∗) = γ. This means that D(η) is decreasing in [0, η∗] and
then increasing in [η∗, 1]. Finally, it is easy to see that η∗(γ) is increasing in γ.
Proposition 6 states an important result regarding the optimal protection deployment. Specif-
ically, the optimal immunization strategy depends on the relative cost of immunization and can
be categorized into three regions. If the immunization cost is sufficiently low (i.e. γ ≤ γ1), then
the optimal strategy is immunizing all agents in the network. If the immunization cost is too
high (i.e. γ ≥ γ2), then the optimal strategy is immunizing no agents in the network. If the
immunization cost is neither too low nor too high, there is a unique optimal level of protection
1− η∗(γ) that depends on the cost γ.
The optimal protection when agents are strategic is significantly different from that when
agents follow a fixed link formation strategy. In the latter case, no matter what fixed strategies
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the agents adopt and what the immunization cost is, immunizing all agents is never the optimal
protection from the network operator’s perspective. This is because immunizing all agents is
unnecessary since as long as the immunization is sufficiently strong, infection will extinguish.
However, in the former case, immunizing all agents is indeed the optimal protection strategy when
the cost is low. This is because, as shown in Theorem 1, no matter how strong the immunization
is, strategic agents have incentives to form more than the critical number of links and hence,
infection never extinguishes. Therefore, if the immunization cost is sufficiently small, then it
is optimal for the network operator to proactively eliminate infection through immunizing all
agents. In Section VII, we will further elaborate these points through numerical results and show
that ignoring the strategic nature of agents may lead to significantly higher system costs.
D. Price of anarchy
In this subsection, we study the system efficiency when agents are strategic. The price of
anarchy (POA) is an important game theoretical concept that measures how the system efficiency
degrades due to selfish behavior of the agents. PoA is defined as the ratio between the social
optimum and the worst equilibrium efficiency. Hence, PoA is always no less than 1 and the
larger PoA, the larger efficiency loss. Since there is a unique equilibrium in our problem, PoA
is simply PoA = EOPT/ECE. Recall that for a given link formation strategy a, the system
efficiency is defined as E(a) = (1− θ(a))u(a) = δu(a)
βa
.
Before we proceed, we note that there is a trivial bound on PoA: since it must be aCE ∈ (ac,W )
and E(a) is decreasing in [ac,W ] according to the proof of Proposition 3, the PoA must satisfy
PoA <
EOPT
E(W )
(30)
If W is close to ac, then the PoA bound is already very tight. In the next proposition, we consider
the case when W is at least twice of ac.
Proposition 7. Let a† , δ+
√
δ2+ρδ
β
> 2ac and κ , a
†u(ac)
acu(a†)
> 1. If W > a†, then the following
holds.
• If u′(a†) < u(a†)
2a†+ρβ−1
, then PoA < κ.
• If u′(a†) > u(a†)
2a†+ρβ−1
, then PoA > κ.
• If u′(a†) = u(a†)
2a†+ρβ−1
, then PoA = κ.
21
Proof. Consider (10), we have already proven that aCE > ac is the unique solution to it.
Rearranging (10) gives
g(a) ,
u(a)
u′(a)
=
ρ+ δ
β − δ
a
+ a =
βa2 + ρa
βa− δ , f(a) (31)
Since (31) is equivalent to (14), there must be a unique solution a > ac such that g(a) = f(a).
First, we prove that g(a) is increasing in the range of [ac,M). This is easy to see because
g′(a) = (u
′(a))2−u(a)u′′(a)
(u′(a))2
> 0. Next, we investigate the monotonicity of f(a). Taking the first-
order derivative,
f ′(a) =
β2a2 − 2βδa− ρδ
(βa− δ)2 =
1
(βa− δ)2 (a− (ac + φρ,δ,β)) (a− (ac − φρ,δ,β)) (32)
where φρ,δ,β ,
√
δ2+ρδ
β
is a constant depending on the system parameters. Let a† = ac + φρ,δ,β.
Therefore f ′(a) < 0 for a ∈ (ac, a†) and f ′(a) > 0, for a ∈ (a†,∞). This means that f(a) is
decreasing in a ∈ (ac, a†) and increasing in a ∈ (a†,∞). Moreover,
f(a†) =
2δ + ρ+ 2
√
δ2 + ρδ
β
= 2a† + ρβ−1 (33)
Since aCE is at where g(a) and f(a) intersects, the value of aCE depends on whether g(a†) >
f(a†) or g(a†) < f(a†). If g(a†) > f(a†), then it must be aCE ∈ (ac, a†). If g(a†) < f(a†), then
it must be aCE ∈ (a†,W ). If g(a†) = f(a†), then aCE = a†. Considering E(a) is decreasing in
a ∈ (ac,W ), the proposition is proved.
Proposition 7 shows how close aCE is to ac depends on the specific form of the utility function,
specifically, the slope of the utility function at a particular point a†. If the utility function increases
slowly enough after forming a certain number of a† links, then agents have incentives to form less
than a† links in equilibrium. This is intuitive because the increased infection threat outweighs
the increased utility by forming more links. Otherwise, agents have incentives to form more
than a† links in equilibrium. Moreover, any utility function that satisfies u′(a†) = u(a
†)
2a†+ρβ−1
must
have the equilibrium be exactly a†, regardless of the value of u(x) at other points than a†. This
analysis leads to the bounds on the PoA: the PoA is upper bounded (i.e. efficiency loss is lower
bounded) by a constant if the instantaneous utility of forming more links increases sufficiently
slowly whereas PoA is lower bounded (i.e. efficiency loss is upper bounded) by a constant if
the instantaneous utility of forming more links increases sufficiently fast.
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VI. HETEROGENOUS AGENTS
In the previous sections, we assumed that agents are homogenous. Many of our results can be
extended to the case of heterogenous agents. In this section, we consider a heterogenous system
where agents are different in terms of the curing rates and show that conjectural equilibrium
exists in this case. In particular, we assume that there are K types of agents, indexed by the set
K = {1, 2, ..., K}. The curing rate for type k agents is δk and the fraction of type k agents is
wk and
∑
k∈K wk = 1.
First, we characterize the stationary distribution when the link formation strategy (a1, ..., aK)
is adopted in which all type k agents adopt the constant strategy ak.
Proposition 8. For given β and the vector of curing rates (δ1, ..., δK), there exists a convex set
C = {(a1, ..., aK) : β
∑
k wkδ
−1
k ak ≤ 1}, such that if (a1, ..., aK) ∈ C, then θ(a1, ..., aK) = 0.
Otherwise, there is a positive infection probability θ, which is the unique solution to
∑
k
wk
βδ−1k ak
θβδ−1k ak + 1
= 1 (34)
Proof. Let θk be the fraction of infected agents among all type k agents. In the steady state, we
have
θk =
δ−1k
δ−1 + (θakβ)−1
=
θakβδ
−1
k
θakβδ
−1
k + 1
, ∀k = 1, 2, ..., K (35)
where the fraction of infected agents among all agents is θ =
∑
k wkθk. It is clear that if θ > 0,
then θk > 0, ∀k and if θ = 0, then θk = 0, ∀k. θ = 0 is a trivial solution of the above equation
in which ak, ∀k can be any value. We now study the non-trivial solution θ > 0. From the above
equation, we have
θ =
θk
akβδ
−1
k (1− θk)
, ∀k = 1, 2, ..., K (36)
and hence, θk = akβδ−1k (1−θk)θ, ∀k. Summing up both sides over k, multiplied by wk, we have
θ =
∑
k
wkθk =
∑
k
wkakβδ
−1
k (1− θk)θ (37)
This leads to
∑
k
wkakβδ
−1
k (1− θk) = 1 (38)
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For all θ > 0, we must have
∑
k
wkakβδ
−1
k > 1. This means that if
∑
k
wkakβδ
−1
k ≤ 1, the only
solution is θ = 0.
We also need to show that if
∑
k
wkakβδ
−1
k > 1, there indeed exists a unique solution θ > 0.
Substituting (35) into (38) gives
f(θ) ,
∑
k
wk
akβδ
−1
k
θakβδ
−1
k + 1
= 1 (39)
Clearly f(θ) is decreasing in θ. Moreover, f(0) =
∑
k wkakβδ
−1
k > 1 and f(1) <
∑
k wk = 1.
Therefore, there must be a unique solution θ ∈ (0, 1) such that f(θ) = 1.
Recall that when agents are homogeneous, there is a single threshold number of links that
is important for determining whether infection persists or extinguishes (see Proposition 1). In
the case of heterogeneous agents, the result is analogous. Since the link formation action is
characterized by a vector instead of a scalar value, the threshold becomes a hyperplane. It is
easy to see that when K = 1, Proposition 7 reduces to Proposition 1. Corollary 2 below is the
extension to Corollary 1, which again resembles the classic result in the SIS literature.
Corollary 2. For a given vector of curing rates (δ1, ..., δK) and a vector of link formation
strategy (a1, ..., aK), there exists βc = 1∑
k
wkδ
−1
k
ak
such that for all β ≤ βc, θ(β) = 0, and for all
β > βc, θ(β) > 0.
Now we are able to show that CE exists and is unique for the case with heterogeneous agents.
Theorem 3. The link formation game with heterogeneous agents has a unique CE. The CE is
symmetric within each type, namely aCEki = a
CE
k , ∀ki, ∀k. Moreover, (aCE1 , ..., aCEK ) 6∈ C.
Proof. Based on our previous analysis on homogeneous epidemic networks, for each type k
agent, the long-term utility is
UH,k(aki ,a−ki) =
ρ+ δk
ρ
b(aki)
ρ+ δk + βi(a)
=
ρ+ δk
ρ
b(ai)
ρ+ δk + βθ(a)aki
(40)
Following the same analysis in the proof of Theorem 1, for any given θ > 0, there is a unique
maximizer for a given δk. Therefore, agents of the same type must take the same action a∗k,
which is unique solution of
b(ak)
b′(ak)
− ak = ρ+ δk
βθ
(41)
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Fig. 1. Steady state for non-strategic agents.
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Fig. 2. Steady state for strategic agents.
We have also shown that LHS is increasing in a. Therefore, for a given θ, a larger δk implies a
larger a∗k and a∗k, ∀k decreases with θ.
Now, the equilibrium must satisfy (34). Next, we show that there indeed exists a unique θ∗
that satisfies both (41) and (34). This is to prove that there is a solution θ to
g(θ) ,
∑
k
wk
βδ−1k a
∗
k(θ)
θβδ−1k a
∗
k(θ) + 1
= 1 (42)
where a∗k(θ) is determined by (41). It is easy to verify that g(θ) is monotonically decreasing in θ
because a∗k(θ) decreases with θ. Moreover, g(1) <
∑
k wk = 1. Because as θ → 0, a∗k(θ) →∞,
we have limθ→0 g(θ) → ∞. As a result, there must be a unique θ ∈ (0, 1) that is solution of
g(θ) = 1. Since θ is unique, the equilibrium link formation strategies must also be unique.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to illustrate the various aspects of our framework
and highlight the importance of understanding the strategic link formation behavior for designing
effective protection mechanisms.
First, we investigate the steady state behavior for both the fixed link formation strategy and
the strategic link formation strategy (under system parameters β = 0.1, δ = 0.3, ρ = 0.05).
The upper plot in Figure 1 shows how the system state evolves over time for different fixed
link formation strategies. Depending on the actions, the fraction of infected agents converges to
different values. The lower plot in Figure 1 further illustrates the converged system state as a
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function of the link formation actions. As predicted by Proposition 1, there exists a threshold
value of a such that the infection dies out if the link formation action is below the threshold.
Figure 2 shows how the system dynamics changes when agents are strategic. The upper plot
shows the evolution of the system state for various curing rates δ. In each case, the system
converges to a positive fraction of infected agents. This fraction decreases as the curing rate
increases. The lower plot shows the link formation action a∗ in the steady state as a function
of δ. When the curing rate is larger, agents tend to form more links since infection is a smaller
threat. However, the number of links that strategic agents are willing to form is always larger
than the critical number in the non-strategic case.
Next, we show that different immunization protection schemes are needed when agents are
strategic (β = 0.1, δ = 0.3, ρ = 0.05). Figure 3 illustrates how the total cost D varies as the
immunization scheme changes for various values of the unit immunization cost γ. To enable
direct comparisons, the action is fixed at a = 4.47, which is the same as the steady state action
for strategic agents when δ = 0.3 (see Figure 2). As we can see, when the unit immunization
cost is large (γ > 1), the optimal scheme immunizes zero agents (i.e. η = 1) whereas when the
unit immunization cost is small (γ < 1), the optimal scheme has η = δ
βa
= 0.67 regardless of
the specific value of γ. Thus, for a given fixed strategy, only two schemes (η = 1 or η = δ
βa
) can
be the optimal scheme. Moreover, it is never optimal to immunize all agents in all cases. This
is what Proposition 2 predicted. On the other hand, when agents are strategic, immunizing all
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Fig. 5. Performance loss due to wrong protection scheme.
agents is actually the optimal protection when the unit immunization cost is sufficiently low, as
shown in Figure 4. The figure also shows that depending on the specific value of γ, the optimal
η is different. When the unit immunization cost is too large, the optimal scheme is to immunize
zero agents.
The above comparison demonstrates the significant importance of understanding the strate-
gic behavior of agents. Suppose that the system designer observes an average degree of 4.47
when there is no immunization protection and wrongly believes that agents are not strategic.
Consequently, the designer will use an immunization scheme η = 0.67 when γ = 0.3 in order
to minimize the total cost. However, since agents are actually strategic, the correct optimal
immunization scheme should be η = 0. This leads to a significant performance loss. Using the
curve for γ = 0.3 in Figure 4, we can compute the increased cost, which is more than 30%
than that if the correct immunization scheme is used. Figure 5 illustrates the total cost difference
for various values of the immunization cost. The cost incurred by using the fixed scheme is the
closest to the optimal cost when γ is around 0.5. This is because the fixed scheme happens to be
close to the optimal scheme. However, when γ is either larger or smaller, significant performance
loss is incurred due to lack of understanding of the strategic behavior of agents. When γ is small,
the total system cost can increase by more than 3 times.
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Fig. 7. Efficiency loss due to strategic behavior.
Finally, we investigate the achievable system efficiency. When agents are non-strategic, the
system design can prescribe link formation actions to agents to maximize the system efficiency.
Figure 6 shows the achievable efficiency as a function of the link formation action (β = 0.1, δ =
0.3, ρ = 0.05). As predicted in Proposition 3, the efficiency is maximized when the agents take
the critical value ac = 3. When agents are strategic, they tend to form higher than the critical
number of links, thereby incurring efficiency loss. This is illustrated in Figure 7 for various
values of the curing rate δ.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the epidemic dynamics in networks endogenously formed by strategic
agents. We showed that such networks exhibit significantly different features than networks that
are exogenously given. An important lesson learned from our analysis is that ignoring the strategic
nature of agents in forming links may result in significantly increased system cost. Therefore,
protection mechanisms that previously apply to non-strategic networks need to be re-designed
and adjusted for networks formed by strategic agents.
Although this paper provides a number of key insights for designing network formed by
strategic agents, we are keenly aware that there are also limitations in the current model, which
tends to be simplistic and stylized. For instance, the current model focuses on only the average
behavior of agents using an mean-field approximation. When there are only a limited number
of agents who may be interacting with topological constraints, different formalism and analysis
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are required to take into account the identity of agents. In the current model, agents are strategic
only in forming links. Another important future work direction is to understand the epidemic
dynamics when agents jointly choose link formation and security investment actions.
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